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Abstract
Individuals’ information security awareness (ISA)
plays a critical role in determining their securityrelated behavior in both organizational and private
contexts. Understanding this relationship has
important implications for individuals and
organizations alike who continuously struggle to
protect their information security. Despite much
research on ISA, there is a lack of an overarching
picture of the concept of ISA and its relationship with
other constructs. By reviewing 40 studies, this study
synthesizes the relationship between ISA and its
antecedents and consequences. In particular, we (1)
examine definitions of ISA; (2) categorize
antecedents of ISA according to their level of origin;
and (3) identify consequences of ISA in terms of
changes in beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and actual
security-related behaviors. A framework illustrating
the relationships between the constructs is provided
and areas for future research are identified.

1. Introduction
In today’s digital world, which is characterized by
a strong reliance on information systems (IS),
organizations continuously aim to uphold their
information security. To protect IS and organizational
information assets at the individual level, information
security awareness (ISA) is considered a crucial
factor in influencing secure behavior [7, 13]. In
general, ISA considers an individual’s knowledge
and understanding of topics related to information
security (e.g., security risks and threats,
organizational security objectives, procedures, and
policies) [37, 39, 42].
To attain deeper knowledge of individuals’ ISA,
IS scholars have carried out research to conceptualize
the construct (e.g., [37]) and to analyze the associated
antecedent and outcome factors through the lens of
their respective discipline (e.g., [7, 13, 14]).
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Despite the considerable advancements in this
research area, several important issues remain to be
addressed. First, some studies refer to the term ISA as
a cognitive state of mind in the form of knowledge
and understanding [7], a continuous intraorganizational process to achieve this state of mind
[43], and/or some kind of security-related behavior
[14], calling for clarification of the concept of ISA.
Second, since multiple factors related to ISA were
examined, a framework for consolidating them and
building a holistic view of ISA is needed. Related to
this issue, very different types of antecedents were
identified,
which
range
from
individual
characteristics through organizational and regulatory
awareness-raising activities to software applications
with awareness-features (e.g. [21, 26, 38, 43]). Yet,
the different levels from where they influence ISA
are not well established, which raises the issue of
how to utilize these factors to increase an individual’s
ISA in an effective manner.
In a similar way, several consequences and
outcomes of ISA were studied, including belief
factors, attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual
behaviors, but how they are organized and
interrelated is not clear, either (for instance, prior
literature reviews allegedly deal with ISA but rather
consider security behavior; cf. [30]). Without an
organization of factors, it is difficult to use them to
develop and implement adequate action plans to
manage information security.
To address these issues, this study provides a
review on ISA, including its definition, its
antecedents, and its outcomes. Building on the
review, the relationships between the factors are
illustrated in a framework and further research
opportunities are identified. Thus, the research
objectives include (1) the integration of research in
the behavioral information security field and the
development of a comprehensive view on ISA, (2)
the organization of the antecedents and outcomes of
ISA to better understand their impact, and (3) the
provision of prescriptions for future research.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. Next, the methodology for identifying,
selecting and classifying articles is described. The
third section reports the findings of the review
followed by the provision of an integrative
framework and identification of eight prescriptions
for future research. Finally, implications and
limitations are discussed.

2. Research methodology
This study follows the common approaches of a
literature review (e.g., [45]). In the first step, the
search criteria are specified, the journal pool, search
string and time range are selected, and articles are
extracted. Next, the unit of analysis and coding
scheme are determined, i.e. constructs are coded and
categorized. Finally, the data is analyzed. A detailed
description of these steps follows.
With regard to the specification of search criteria,
the following inclusion and exclusion criteria were
applied. First, only studies in the information security
domain are considered, whereas other topics such as
physical security are not discussed. The second
criterion relates to the individual-level, as we
consider only employees’ and IS users’ ISA. Other
levels of research such as from a social perspective
are excluded. Third, this study analyzes empirically
tested or proposed behavioral studies only, which
excludes other types of research such as design
studies and descriptive studies. Fourth, to be
included, studies needed to have a construct related to
ISA, which means that studies considering awareness
without a construct or merely mentioning its
importance are not considered. Finally, to improve
rigor, the focus of this review is on peer-reviewed
academic research, which excludes practitioner
articles, dissertations, and books.
To ensure a rigorous and systematic search [45], a
meta-search engine that integrates search results from
several academic literature databases (see
www.litsonar.com) was used. Here, all 109
publication outlets of the “Association for
Information Systems (AIS) Toplist” were selected
and then searched whether a publication contained
the term ‘awareness’ in the title, abstract or keywords
by directly accessing the outlet or generating search
queries for the following databases: ACM Digital
Library, AISeL, EBSCO Business Source Complete,
ScienceDirect, and IEEEXplore. Further search
options included that no restrictions for a time period
were set and that only peer-reviewed articles should
be considered. By using ‘awareness’ as a broad
search term, a search result as comprehensive as

possible was generated, i.e. 1832 potentially relevant
publications were identified in total. These articles
were manually examined to filter out those
publications that did not meet our previously
described inclusion and exclusion criteria. This
filtering process resulted in 26 conceptual and
empirical articles. Next, these articles were used to
conduct backward and forward searches resulting in
additional 32 articles, of which 14 were selected
following the previously described filtering criteria.
The unit of analysis considers constructs and their
causal relationships including the following items:
(1) explicit definitions of awareness constructs, (2)
antecedents, and (3) outcomes. The coding results of
the final set of 40 selected publications on ISA
including authors, publication outlet, and their
allocation to the three criteria are presented in Table
1 in the appendix.

3. Research findings
In this section, findings from the content analysis
are reported, including a categorization of definitions,
antecedents, and outcomes of ISA.

3.1 Definitions of ISA
By analyzing the concept of awareness as it is
perceived in the IS security literature, several more or
less distinctive definitions are identified. Awareness
does not only cover aspects of an individual’s
cognitive state of mind, such as being conscious or
having knowledge of something (e.g., [7, 13, 35]),
some definitions also include procedural aspects, i.e.
the processes used to achieve this state of mind (e.g.,
[43]). Few definitions do not distinguish awareness
from a certain kind of behavior (e.g., [18, 38]).
By understanding information security awareness
(ISA) as cognitive state of mind, Bulgurcu et al. [7]
distinguish the concept into the overall knowledge
and understanding about security issues and their
potential consequences on the one hand, and about
requirements prescribed in the organization’s
information security policies on the other hand. A
further example is provided by Rhee et al. [35], who
define ISA as “the vigilance in understanding various
information security threats and in perceiving one’s
vulnerability related to these threats” (p. 2). In
contrast, Tsohou et al. [43] regard ISA as “a process
that aims at changing individuals’ perceptions,
values, attitudes, behavior, norms, work habits, and
organizational culture and structures with regard to
secure information practices” (p. 1). Behavioral
aspects are considered by Spears and Barki [38] who
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regard ISA as a state reflected in the behavior of
target groups (e.g., employees) and by Galvez and
Guzman [18] who consider ISA as one of the
information security behaviors.
In the remainder of the review, we consider ISA
from the cognitive state of mind perspective to
clearly differentiate it from the awareness-raising
processes and subsequent outcome factors, such as
behavioral reactions. This perspective implies that
awareness-raising processes (i.e., antecedents of ISA)
represent input variables of ISA, whereas the
subsequent belief, attitudinal and behavioral reactions
represent output variables.

3.2 Antecedents of ISA
This section reviews publications proposing or
empirically investigating antecedents of ISA. The
antecedents are organized based on their levels of
origin: individual factors, organizational factors,
social-environmental factors, and technological
factors. In the following, a summary of these factors
is provided.
3.2.1. Individual antecedents. The individual level
includes factors originating from the employee or IS
user. An individual’s general IS knowledge has been
empirically found as a determinant of ISA, since the
higher their knowledge of basic IS applications the
more likely individuals are aware of security-related
issues [21, 36]. Previous negative experience with
information security incidents has been found to lead
to higher levels of an individual’s ISA [21]. On the
other hand, computer anxiety (i.e., the fears users feel
in working with computers) has been found to
negatively impact users’ awareness of security
measures [29].
3.2.2.
Organizational
antecedents.
The
organizational level covers factors under the
influence of an organization. It is suggested that the
formalization of work procedures, which make it
more likely that awareness-increasing security
controls
exist,
organizational
IS
security
communication, and the individual’s perception of
value of information increases an individual’s ISA
through a heightened perception of the importance of
information
protection
[20].
In
addition,
management’s support of IS security initiatives by
championing them is considered to be a main driver
for making each individual aware of the importance
of information security and evoking a company-wide
ISA [25]. Furthermore, information security policies
(ISPs) are considered to be an important information

security management practice and the provision and
promotion of IPSs has been empirically found to be
an effective organizational practice to increase
individuals’ awareness of information security issues
[21]. Another important information security
management practice to increase ISA of various
stakeholders are security education, training, and
awareness raising (SETA) programs. SETA
programs aim to increase employees’ security
expertise, to develop security-relevant skills and
competencies, and to make them aware of the
importance of security and potential security issues
(e.g. risks, threats) as well as procedures, rules, and
procedures stated in the ISPs [13, 39, 47]. Empirical
support for SETA programs increasing individuals’
ISA has been provided by several studies [9, 13, 21,
39]. Another valuable method for raising ISA is the
involvement of IS end-users in the development
process of organizational information security
controls. Spears and Barki [38], for instance, applied
user participation theories and empirically
demonstrated that users’ participation in security risk
management processes contributed to an increased
awareness of organizational policies, procedures and
security risks along different target groups.
3.2.3. Social-environmental antecedents. The
social-environmental level incorporates factors not
under the direct influence of the organization’s
management and originates from individuals’
interaction with their social environment. Hadasch et
al. [20] proposed that public expectations of
information protection as well as security
requirements from regulatory bodies and business
partners heighten an individual’s ISA through the
individual’s perception of information leakage
incidents as being a threat. Secondary sources (e.g.
media information about security issues) have a
positive impact on ISA by awakening interest and
knowledge about information security [21, 33].
Social learning cues that positively impact
employees’ awareness of organizational ISPs include
security-related peer behavior (also termed vicarious
experience) [21, 27], situational support (i.e., the
degree to which employees perceive their task
environment favors ISP compliance) and verbal
persuasion (i.e., feedback or instructions received by
others to support ISP compliance) [27]. Albeit not
empirically tested, it is suggested that public
awareness campaigns or awareness programs are
possible measures to raise users’ awareness and
sensitize them towards protecting their data [28].
3.2.4. Technological antecedents. Influencing
factors at the technological level originate from
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technical tools with integrated awareness features
that were designed and developed with the objective
to increase users’ ISA in specific software
applications by alerting the users to possible security
threats that may arise. Just-in-time reminders in the
form of pop-ups as SETA program components
intended to raise employees’ ISA attract employees’
attention and reminds them of what has been learned
in previous security training about, for instance,
disclosing customer information [26]. Similarly, the
frequency of received information security warning
messages was proposed but not yet empirically tested
to increase individuals’ levels of ISA [49].

3.3 Outcomes of ISA
The outcomes of ISA also received considerable
attention in research. Most of these factors were
analyzed using the perspective of the theory of
reasoned action (TRA; [17]) and the theory of
planned behavior (TPB; [1]). This includes belief
factors, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and actual
behaviors, which are summarized in the following.
3.3.1. Beliefs. We identified 17 variables through
which ISA indirectly affects attitudes, behavioral
intentions, and actual behaviors (owing to the
limitations of space, definitions are not provided but
are available from the authors upon request). These
variables relate to behavioral beliefs, instrumental
beliefs, and normative beliefs.
With regard to behavioral beliefs, an individual’s
increased ISA leads to the formation of outcome
beliefs of a certain kind of behavior. For instance,
ISA is positively associated with beliefs about the
benefit of ISP compliant behavior, which include
intrinsic benefit, safety, rewards [7], perceived
response efficacy [34], and ISP-related personal
norms [48]. Further, ISA is associated with beliefs
about the costs of ISP compliant behavior, which
includes a negative relationship with work
impediment [7] and a positive relationship with
perceived response cost [34]. With regard to beliefs
about the cost of noncompliant behavior, ISA is
positively
associated
with
intrinsic
cost,
vulnerability, and sanctions [7]. Sanctions have also
been considered as a dyadic construct including
perceived certainty of sanctions and perceived
severity of sanctions, which are positively influenced
by user awareness of security countermeasures
(security policies, SETA programs, and computer
monitoring) [10, 12, 13, 24]. With regard to
instrumental beliefs about adopting technologies, ISA
positively influences both perceived usefulness (e.g.,

of firewalls to protect home computers [29] and of
ISPs [2]) and perceived ease of use (e.g., of ISPs [2]).
With regard to normative beliefs, ISA positively
influences subjective norm about using protective
technologies, such as antispyware software [14], and
social norms about acceptable ISP compliant
behavior [4].
3.3.2. Attitudes. Following TRA and TPB, attitude is
the direct outcome of beliefs, which was examined in
many studies. Several studies found empirical
evidence that ISA positively impacts attitudes toward
ISPs compliance directly [4–7] and indirectly via
several belief factors [6, 7]. Similarly, Dinev and Hu
[14] showed that technology awareness positively
influenced
attitude
toward
using
security
technologies (e.g., anti-spyware software) and Kumar
et al. [29] showed a direct positive effect of
awareness of security measures on attitude towards
using a firewall and an indirect positive impact via
perceived usefulness.
3.3.3. Behavioral intentions. Behavioral intention
has an essential role in human behavior [1, 17].
Empirical studies in this area have been categorized
into two fields with regard to whether they refer to
behavior that is supportive vs. disruptive of security.
Examples of behavioral intentions that are supportive
of security include intentions to comply with ISPs [3,
7, 21, 34, 37] and to adopt security technologies [14,
22, 29, 31]. Examples of behavioral intentions that
are disruptive of security include intention to commit
IS access policy violation [44] and to misuse IS [13,
24]. Here, the general conclusion is that ISA has a
positive impact on behavioral intentions that are
supportive of security and a negative impact on
intentions that are disruptive of security.
3.3.4. Actual behaviors. Several studies also
analyzed the impact of ISA on actual behavior.
Following the same two-field classification as
described in the previous subsection, examples of
actual behaviors that are supportive of security
include controlling insider threats to information
security [47], information security practices at work
[18], coping with system risk [39], managerial
actions toward information security [8], ISP
compliant behavior [48], and desktop security
behaviors [23, 46]. The first two studies are of
conceptual nature and propose that ISA may be a
major factor in reducing insider threats and
increasing security practices at work. The last five
studies find empirical evidence that ISA positively
impacts managers’ coping behavior with system risk
and their actions towards information security,
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increases employees’ ISP compliance, and improves
home users’ desktop security behaviors.
In contrast, actual security disruptive behaviors
include problematic IS security behavior [40] and
unauthorized information disclosure [26]. Takemura
[40], for instance, found that problematic IS security
behavior with regard to organizational information
security measures is reduced significantly when
individuals have higher levels of ISA.

3.4 Moderating effects involving ISA
Some studies examined factors that moderate the
relationship between ISA and outcome variables.
Computer self-efficacy and perceived virtual status
were found to negatively moderate the effects of ISA
on unauthorized access intentions [11]. Further, the
relationship between social learning cues and ISA has
been weaker for remote employees in comparison to
in-house employees, suggesting a moderating role of
“remote” status [27]. Further studies have proposed
that personality attributes and traits (e.g.,
conscientiousness; [32]) might have an important role
in the relationship between ISA and security
behavior.

4. Discussion
The review identified multiple antecedents and
outcomes related to information security awareness

4.1. Prescriptions from the definition of
awareness analysis
The first objective was to analyze how ISA is
perceived and conceptualized in the information
security community by looking at the various
definitions. Although a considerable amount of
research has been done, a coherent conceptualization
of awareness is lacking. While a concerning amount
of studies do not provide an explicit definition, the
analysis showed that ISA is perceived as a
multidimensional issue covering cognitive, process,
and behavioral aspects.

3

Individual factors
1. IS knowledge
2. Negative experience
3. Computer anxiety (-)

5

Organizational factors
1. Formalization of work procedures
2. Security communication
3. Perceived value of information
4. Management support
5. ISP provision
6. SETA programs
7. User participation

Social-environmental factors
1. Public expectations of information
protection
2. Security requirements from
regulatory bodies and business
partners
3. Security-related peer behavior
4. Secondary sources‘ influence
5. Situational support
6. Verbal persuasion
7. Public awareness campaigns
Technological factors
1. Security warning messages
2. Just-in-time reminders

(ISA) and building a holistic view of these factors is
important for additional research and practice.
Based on our review, an integrative framework
for the study on ISA as an individual’s cognitive state
of mind is provided in Figure 1. The central construct
in this figure is ISA, with its antecedents originating
from the individual, organizational, socialenvironmental, and technological level (on the left)
as well as its outcomes and their relationships (on the
right). The literature review described in detail the, so
that the emphasis in the following is to work out
prescriptions for future research using the insights of
the literature review and the framework. Dotted
circles in Figure 1 indicate where the prescriptions fit
into the framework.

6

7

Instrumental beliefs
1. Perceived usefulness
2. Perceived ease of use

1
Information
security
awareness
2

Behavioral beliefs
1. Intrinsic benefit
2. Safety of resources
3. Rewards
4. Perceived response efficacy
5. ISP-related personal norms
6. Work impediment
7. Perceived response cost
8. Intrinsic cost
9. Vulnerability of resources
10. Perceived certainty of sanctions
11. Perceived severity of sanctions

8

Attitude

Behavioral
intention

Actual
behavior

Normative beliefs
1. Subjective norms
Control beliefs
1. Perceived behavioral control
2. Self-efficacy

4

Figure 1. Integrative framework for the study on information security awareness
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Accordingly, different understandings of the
concept of awareness exist, and consequently
different angles from which it can be approached and
examined. However, by not clearly separating those
three aspects but merging them, a diffuse and
partially inconsistent understanding of the term
prevails.
The revelation of terminology ambiguity implies
a need for future research to create a well-defined set
of terms for awareness, since a consistent
understanding of the subject matter is crucial for
value-adding studies. The study findings and insights
could be considered as a starting point to further
examine the conceptualization and nature of
awareness. We suggest that research should explicitly
indicate which aspect of awareness (either cognitive,
process, or behavior) is examined. This helps to
clearly specify the impact of the antecedent factors
and the effect on the outcome factors. In particular,
our integrative framework (Figure 1) implies that
awareness raising processes represent an input
variable of ISA (as a cognitive state of mind),
whereas behavior represents an output variable. The
first prescription includes:
1. Overcome terminology ambiguity by establishing
a basic consensus of the nature of awareness and
by differentiating ISA as a cognitive state of
mind from awareness-raising activities and
subsequent behaviors.
Current research predominantly relies on static
aspects of ISA, such as the general knowledge and
understanding of security threats and information
security policies (e.g., [7]). However, static
awareness concepts are often formed before
individuals perform a security-relevant behavior and
thus do not reflect situation-specific aspects of the
process individuals follow while performing secure
behavior. Individuals may be considered security
aware in general, but in a certain usage situation they
might be unaware that they are confronted with a
security-related issue. Little attention has been paid
to the role that a specific situation plays in regulating
awareness and its behavioral outcomes. We propose
to consider situational aspects in explaining
individuals’
security-related
behavior
by
conceptualizing and examining individuals’ level of
situation awareness of security threats. The threelevel model of situation awareness [16] could be used
as a theoretical foundation and an individual’s
perception, comprehension, and projection of
information security threats could be measured by
applying experimental study designs. Hence:
2. Reflect individuals’ level of situation awareness
in information security to further investigate the
concept of ISA.

4.1. Prescriptions from the antecedents of
awareness analysis
Within the in-depth analysis, a broad set of
determinants are discovered and classified into
individual, organizational, social-environmental, and
technological influencing factors of awareness
according to their levels of origin.
On the individual level, general IS knowledge,
negative experience with incidents and computer
anxiety were found to determine ISA. As research on
individual-level antecedents is limited, more attention
towards them is still required. Further individuallevel antecedents, such as personality traits,
demographics (age, gender, education, income) or
characteristics (workload, overall job attitude,
organizational commitment) should be examined
with empirical research. One particular direction for
future research could be to investigate the
individuals’ hierarchy level in a company, i.e.
whether factors influencing employees’ ISA (as it has
been mainly examined in the reviewed studies) also
influence managers’ ISA (which has been largely left
unregarded). This line of research is particularly
important in light of a study done by Taylor [41] who
identified an optimistic bias among managers, in
particular managers were unaware of the security risk
arising from employees’ unintentional actions.
Hence:
3. Study different types of stakeholders while
further investigating influencing factors of ISA.
On the organizational level, SETA programs and
the provision of ISPs have been identified as
important security management practices to increase
an individual’s ISA. Whereas these security
management practices focus on non-technical means
to increase an individual’s ISA, future research
should aim to explore further potential antecedents,
which are of technical nature. For this purpose, the
effectiveness of tools providing information about
security issues or referring to the organization’s ISPs
immediately before a foreseeable security breach
(e.g., an ISP violation) in raising an individual’s ISA
could be examined. This line of thought has been
investigated in information privacy research (e.g.,
warning mechanisms provided by tools before
disclosing personal information), but with few
exceptions neglected to a large extent in information
security research. Thus:
4. Further investigate the effectiveness of technical
means to increase ISA.
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4.2. Prescriptions from the outcomes of
awareness analysis
The last focus of this review was to provide
insights into outcomes of awareness and associated
relationships with other constructs. The in-depth
analysis has shown that an individual’s ISA is
regarded as one of the central antecedents of behavior
that is supportive or disruptive of security. However,
there are several limitations to the empirical studies
investigating the effect of ISA on security-related
behavior.
Many studies are conducted in western cultures
(e.g., USA), thereby neglecting possible cultural
differences. However, findings of Hovav and D’Arcy
[24] indicate that cultural differences associated with
ISA’s impact on IS misuse might exist between
South Korean and US users. Further insights into the
relationship between ISA and security-related
behavior with samples from different countries needs
to be gained. In addition to cross-cultural differences
with regard to cultural values (e.g., power distance,
individualism, uncertainty avoidance), regulatory
structures (omnibus, sectoral, or non-regulation/selfhelp) might differ across countries and should be
examined in greater detail. Thus:
5. Further investigate cross-cultural differences
involving ISA and security-related behavior.
With the increasing use of private devices (e.g.,
private smartphones, home computers) to access
organizational IS and the blurring boundaries
between work and personal business, security-related
behavior is also relevant in contexts outside of the
organization. However, many studies focus on
behaviors of individuals within organizational
settings. Remote employees, for instance, are an
understudied class of employees who tend to exhibit
lower levels of ISA in comparison with their in-house
colleagues [27]. As organizational security practices
may be less prevalent in remote workplaces and own
practices of security protection may be more
dominant, potential distinctions in ISA and its
relationship with behavior regarding different work
settings should be analyzed. Hence:
6. Consider the influence of ISA on behavior in
contexts outside of the organization.
Some
studies
indicate
that
individual
characteristics (personality attributes and traits) may
moderate the relationship between ISA and behavior.
However, few studies address the effects of
individual characteristics on this relationship
empirically. Understanding the differences between
individuals is essential to understanding underlying
psychological mechanisms impacting the relationship
between ISA and behavior. Thus, the effects of

demographic factors (e.g., age, gender, education,
income), personality traits (e.g., Big Five personality
traits), and psychological states (e.g., a psychological
need for safety, risk-taking propensity) should be
further investigated with cumulative research. Thus:
7. Conduct additional research for a better
understanding of moderating effects involving
ISA and behavior.
Finally, several studies used very static and
generic measures for behavioral intention, like ISP
compliance [7, 34] or IS misuse intentions [13, 24].
Further studies could enquire situation-specific
behaviors, i.e. behavioral reactions at the moment
that a security-related event occurs. For instance,
upon receiving a phishing mail, security aware
employees may try to verify the sender address,
delete it and/or inform colleagues or the IT
department in the organization. On the other hand,
unaware employees may download a malicious
attachment followed by executing it. By capturing the
nuances of the process individuals follow while
performing secure or unsecure behavior, new insights
into the complex interaction of information
processing (how employees become aware of a
threat) and decision making can be gained. Thus:
8. Apply more situation-specific measures of ISA
and behavior.

4.3. Theoretical and practical implications
This study contributes to the literature in several
ways by providing a comprehensive review of studies
on individual’s ISA and creating a holistic picture of
the construct and its relationship with several
antecedent and outcome factors.
First, researchers are advised to explicitly indicate
which type and aspect of awareness, either cognitive,
process, or behavior, is examined in their study on
ISA. This contributes to unambiguously determining
the impact of the antecedent factors and the effect on
the outcome factors. Further, the categorization of
antecedent factors into four levels of origin may help
empirical studies to structure their factors and by
considering all four levels in their research help to
provide a more comprehensive picture. Last but not
least, the categorization of behaviors according to
their supportive vs. disruptive nature helps to identify
which kind of behaviors have been neglected by prior
studies and should be further examined. Naturally, it
is desirable that the framework for ISA research
based on the in-depth analysis is empirically tested in
whole or in blocks using surveys or experiments, or
by conducting meta-analyses on prior research.
For practitioners, identifying and understanding
the different types of antecedents of ISA at four
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different levels yields crucial insights to ensure the
success of information security objectives and
encourage the desired security-related behavior. A
combination of antecedents at different levels seems
promising. For instance, managers could increase
their employees’ ISA not only through SETA
programs and ISPs but also by identifying and
supporting security-aware employees, who champion
information security awareness among other
employees (since observing peers’ compliant
behavior has been found to increase ISA).
For individuals, several factors influencing their
security-related behaviors were highlighted. A
selected combination of the identified antecedents of
awareness may help individuals to become equipped
with the necessary knowledge and skills to make
informed decisions on how to deal with security
issues.

4.4. Limitations of the literature review
Although this literature review provides valuable
insights into the concept of awareness within IS
security research and points to several research gaps,
some limitations need to be considered. First, the
findings of this review are limited by the selection of
the literature. The review is based on a
comprehensive evaluation of peer-reviewed journals
and conference proceedings. Although the inclusion
of publications of controlled quality ensures a high
quality of the literature base, some relevant
contributions may be missing in the review due to the
exclusion of non-peer-reviewed publications. Second,
the search and selection process further restricts the
results. In particular, the search term applied is
limited to the English language by which publications
in other languages are neglected. Third, this research
considers only awareness-related constructs in the
information security realm. A comparison with
similar constructs such as security knowledge or
mindfulness could help to enhance knowledge of the
employees’ cognitive states of mind related to
security.
In conclusion, research on information security
awareness is still an evolving field with many
uncharted areas to be explored. Further empirical
studies that build upon the research opportunities
recognized in this study are needed.
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